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Abstract. One of the main problems of modern navigation both manned and unmanned 
transport systems is a problem of transport safety. To improve the accuracy of transport po-
sitioning used Differential GNSS technology, which is based on setting a fixed referent sta-
tion with a known position XYZ. Unfortunately, GNSS is vulnerable to malicious intrusion 
with the help of cyber-attacks as Jamming and Spoofing. GNSS signals and/or correction 
signals of DGNSS referent station can be jammed and/or spoofed by false signals, but spe-
cial receivers can provide defenses against such attacks. How can the rover receiver (i. e., 
the user) be sure that the information they receive is authentic? Spoofing is the transmis-
sion of matched-GNSS-signal-structure and/or signals of referent station interference in 
an attempt to commandeer the tracking loops of a victim receiver and thereby manipulate 
the receiver’s timing or navigation solution. A spoofer can transmit its counterfeit signals 
from a stand-off distance of several hundred meters, or it can be co-located with its vic-
tim. In this article we consider the principles of spoofing detection using mainly Differen-
tial GNSS, in which a correction signals of referent station uses for detection of spoofing.
Keywords. GNSS, DGNSS, differential station, reference station, radio beacon, 
antiterrorism, antispoofing.
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1. Introduction
Marine environments present some of the most challenging positioning 
conditions in the world — raging currents, rugged coastlines, narrow pas-
sageways and high winds. Modern satellite navigation is based on the use of 
no-request range measurements between navigational satellite and the user. 
It means that the information about the satellite’s coordinates given to the 
user, is included into navigation signal. The way of range measurements is 
based on the calculation of the receiving signal time delay compared with 
the signals, generated by the users equipment [1].
Satellite based positioning provides the world’s most precise location in-
formation. It is possible to acquire positioning anywhere in the world that 
GNSS satellite signals are available, any time of day, at data rates up to 
100 Hz. Measurements can be generated in real time or processed post- 
mission to achieve the highest level of accuracy.
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GNSS technology is most frequently used to:
•	 determine the location of an object on or with respect to the Earth 
for navigation;
•	 locate an object with respect to another object for tracking purposes.
Positioning information typically provided includes a horizontal domain 
(latitude/longitude or easting/northing) and a vertical domain (height).
To improve the accuracy of transport positioning used Differential GNSS 
technology, which is based on setting a fixed referent station with a known 
position XYZ. For example, Oceanix  1 provides accurate GNSS corrections 
to enable sub-decimetre positioning for marine hydrographic survey, dredg-
ing, mapping, coastal patrolling and other non-oil and gas marine applica-
tions. The high rate corrections broadcast enables carrier phase ambiguity 
resolution within the GNSS receiver, greatly enhancing the accuracy and 
speeding recovery from GNSS signal interruptions.
Oceanix Nearshore correction service delivers exceptional sub-decimetre 
positioning for diverse marine applications including dredging, hydrograph-
ic survey and mapping. The high-rate corrections broadcast enables carri-
er phase ambiguity resolution within the GNSS receiver, greatly enhancing 
the accuracy and speeding recovery from GNSS signal interruptions. Oce-
anix includes precise GNSS clock and orbit correction data providing high 
accuracy: 4 cm horizontal and 6 cm vertical.
Fig. 1. OCEANIX GNSS correction service  2 
1 Marine Brochure [Electronic recourse]. URL: http://www.novatel.
com/assets/Documents/Papers/Novatel-Marine-Brochure.pdf [URL Address is avail-
able 5/14/2017 6:30 PM].
2 Ibid.
OCEANIX Sat1
GNSS Sat1
GNSS Sat2
GNSS Sat3
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Sometimes you do not need to know your precise position but you do 
need to know your position or an object’s position, relative to another object 
or location. GNSS relative positioning solutions  3 are used to:
•	 determine where an object is located on earth with respect to anoth-
er object’s location;
•	 determine the horizontal and vertical distances between one object 
to another object (the horizontal and vertical distances can also be 
referred to as baseline lengths, displacements, relative separations or 
offsets between the two objects).
Applications requiring relative GNSS positioning include:
•	 landing systems such as helicopter to aircraft carrier;
•	 railway collision avoidance systems;
•	 autonomous in air refueling;
•	 safety systems where a device beep increases in volume as you ap-
proach another object or location;
•	 automated ship docking systems.
Main definitions:
•	 GNSS — Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS: www.
glonass-iac.ru, GPS: www.navcen.uscg.gov, BEIDOU: en.beidou.
gov.cn, GALILEO: www.gsc-europa. eu, QZSS: www.qzs.jp/en/ser-
vices).
•	 DGNSS — Differential GNSS.
•	 Sati i N N, , ,= і1 4  — the navigation satellites as the space part of 
GNSS. {In ideal case, when the measurements are precise and sat-
ellite time is identical with the user’s equipment time the users posi-
tioning can be realized with 3 satellites. Actually satellites time dif-
fers from the time on the users equipment. So, for users positioning 
one more coordinate is necessary — time drift between users equip-
ment and the satellite time. That’s why four satellites are needed for 
the solving of navigation problem.} 
•	 Almanac is a package of ephemeris of all the satellites belong to glob-
al navigation system.
•	 Ephemeris — a coordinates package, which uniquely determine the 
satellites position and velocity.
•	 DS — Differential Station — control correction station subsystem 
differential GNSS, including a Reference Station with their own co-
ordinates ( , , )x y zrs rs rs  and the Radio Beacon transmitting correc-
tion information.
•	 Spoofing — attack on GNSS, which is trying to deceive the GNSS re-
ceiver, transmitting the powerful false signals that mimic the signals 
from GNSS and exceeding the power of true signals from GNSS.
3 GNSS Relative Positioning [Electronic recourse]. URL: http://www.novatel.
com/solutions/relative-positioning [URL Address is available 5/14/2017 6:30 PM].
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•	 Spoofer — complex computer and radio equipment for the implemen-
tation of GNSS spoofing.
•	 Rover — any mobile GNSS receiver that is used to collect data in the 
field at an unknown location.
•	 Pseudo-range — distance to the satellite, resulting in the receiver based 
on the correlation of the received code and on-board code without 
correction of clock synchronization errors.
•	 RTCM — Radio Technical Commission for Maritime Services — de-
fine a differential data link for the real-time differential correction of 
roving GNSS receivers.
•	 WGS-84 — World Geodetic System 1984 describes the shape of the 
Earth.
•	 x y z, ,( )  — the real coordinates of the vehicle  4.
•	 ( , , )x y zv v v – the calculated coordinates of the vehicle using the 
GNSS.
•	 ( , , )  x y zv v v – the calculated coordinates of the vehicle using the 
DGNSS.
•	 ( , , )x y zrs rs rs – the coordinates of RS.
•	 We also denote for i N N= і1 4, ,� � :
( , , )x y zi i i – the coordinates of Sati;  
Ti
rs  — the propagation time from the Sati  to the RS in vacuum;
T i
rs
  — the propagation time from the Sati to the RS in real atmosphere;
Di
rs – the real distance from the Sati  to the RS;
Di
rs
 – the measurement result of the distance from the Sati  to the 
RS (evaluations of Di
rs  or pseudo-range);
DD  — the positioning error;
Ti
v  — the propagation time from the Sati  to the vehicle in vacuum;
T i
v
  — the propagation time from the Sati to the vehicle in real at-
mosphere;
Di
v
  — the measurement result of the distance from the Sati to the ve-
hicle (the vehicle pseudo-ranges).
2. GNSS and DGNSS Positioning
The distance from vehicle (Fig. 2) to satellites Sati  can be written as 
D x x y y z z cT i N Ni
v
i v i v i v i
v� � � �= -( ) + -( ) + -( ) = = і2 2 2 1 4, , , .   (1) 
4 If the vehicle is 2D vehicle (ship, vessel, boat, car, etc.), the height coordinate (z) 
can be omitted and minimum number of navigation satellites can be reduced to three 
( i N N= і1 3, ,� � ).
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Since the measurement of distance from the vehicle to the satellites is 
carried out by measuring the propagation time T T Ti
V
i
V
i
V
 = + D  of GNSS 
signals from Sati  to vehicle then (1) can be represented as (excluding time 
synchronization errors):
 x x y y z z cTi v i v i v i
v
-( ) + -( ) + -( ) =� �
�2 2 2
 , i N N= і1 4, ,� � .  (2) 
 
Fig. 2. GNSS: Sati — “Satellites”, i N N= і1 4, ,� � ,  
the visible part of GNSS satellite constellation 
The navigation processor of vehicle solves the system of the equations (2), 
calculate the position of the vehicle ( , , )x y zv v v  and timing errors on board 
Dt , which are used to correct the clock GNSS navigation (this article is not 
consider the timing errors Dt )  5. The positioning error may be defined as 
 D = -( ) + -( ) + -( )D x x y y z zv v v
2 2 2   (3) 
on condition that the real coordinates of the vehicle x y z, ,( )  known since 
the geodesic (centimeter) accuracy. Analyzing the problem of positioning 
accuracy (2), we note that 
 T T Ti
v
i
v
i
v

�
� �= + D{ } , i N N= і1 4, ,� �   (4) 
that is, the accuracy is largely determined by the size of the propagation time 
delay from the Sati  to the vehicle DTi
v �.
Support for GNSS Positioning technology will solve the problem of po-
sitioning in the meter range (5–10 m). Currently, to improve the accuracy 
of GNSS are widely used the differential GNSS.
5 The calculations require the exact time, and most GNSS receivers do not contain 
sufficiently precise internal clock, therefore, to remove the ambiguity with respect to time, 
need another equation that allows to obtain the exact time — this equation gives a fourth 
satellite. Thus, for high-precision positioning receiver enough signals of four satellites.
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 2.1. Differential GNSS Positioning
In order to increase the accuracy of GNSS to a level that provides swim-
ming ships in rivers and canals, was developed differential subsystem DGNSS 
[2–7], consisting of ground differential base stations that receive signals from 
satellites, counting errors for signals about its (actual) position in the system 
WGS84 and transmit errors by a special radio network or by satellite. Cor-
recting Reed-Solomon codes are used for error-correcting coding. DGNSS 
are divided into three categories (Fig. 3).
Fig. 3. LADGNSS — Local Area Differential; RADGNSS — Regional Area  
Differential GNSS; WADGNSS — Wide Area Differential GNSS 
LADGNSS — Differential station transmitting correction information 
up to ~ 200 km of coastline. RADGNSS — formed by combining data of 
a few LADGNSS that located in the same region. Master station transmitting 
correction information up to ~ M·200 km of coastline, where M is number of 
LADGNSS. WADGNSS — formed by combining data of a few RADGNSS 
that located in a same region, a same state or a group of bordering states. The 
transmitting of correction information in the unlimited field of the Earth can 
be implemented in two ways: through a communication satellite or a group 
of satellites, for example, using the Network Transport of RTCM via satel-
lite link; through the Internet, for example, using the Network Transport of 
RTCM via Internet protocol (NTRIP).
 2.2. Local Area DGNSS Positioning
Since RS is at known location ( , , )x y zrs rs rs� � � we can compute the real dis-
tance from RS (Fig. 2) to satellites Sati  as 
 D x x y y z z i N Ni
rs
i rs i rs i rs= -( ) + -( ) + -( ) = і
2 2 2
1 4, , , .� �   (5) 
We calculate the assessment of the distance from RS (Fig. 2) to satellites 
Sati  (pseudo-range) by determining the signal propagation time from RS 
to the satellites Sati  as 
 D cT i N Ni
rs
i
rs
 = = і, , ,1 4   (6) 
Local Area 
Differential GNSS
Regional Area 
Differential GNSS
D
G
N
SS
Wide Area 
Differential GNSS
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and now we can compute the correction of a pseudo-range for all vehicles in 
limited scope:
 D = - = іD D D i N Ni
rs
i
rs
i
rs( ), , , . � �1 4   (7) 
 
Fig. 4. Local Area Differential GNSS: this figure shows a receiver at a known  
position (the Reference Station) and a 2nd receiver on board of the vehicle  
at an unknown position (i. e. the rover or user) for relative positioning. Because  
the GNSS position errors for the Reference Station and for the rover are  
approximately the same, the difference between the known and unknown locations  
of the  Reference Station can be used to improve the accuracy of the positioning 
The Radio Beacon transmit the correction DDi
rs  to all vehicles, that ad-
justing their pseudo-range as 
   D D D cT D i N Ni
v
i
v
i
rs
i
v
i
rs�
�
� � �= -D( ) = - D( ) = і, , , .1 4   (8) 
In this case the system of the equations (2) assumes the form 
 
x x y y z z D cT D
i N
i v i v i v i
v
i
v
i
rs-( ) + -( ) + -( ) = = - D( )
=
    2 2 2
1
� �
�
,
, ,N і 4.
  (9) 
The navigation processor of vehicle solves the system of equations (10) 
and calculate the position of the vehicle ( , , )  x y zv v v� � . The positioning er-
ror may be defined as 
 D = -( ) + -( ) + -( )D x x y y z zv v v  
2 2 2   (10) 
on condition that the real coordinates of the vehicle (x, y, z) known since the 
geodesic accuracy. The support for Differential GNSS positioning technol-
ogy will solve the positioning problem in high-accuracy (10–20 cm).
62
 URAL RADIO ENGINEERING JOURNAL  
Ev
ge
ny
 O
ch
in
 |
  G
N
S
S
 a
nd
 D
G
N
S
S
 S
po
ofi
ng
 D
et
ec
tio
n
 2.3. Regional Area DGNSS Positioning
Let’s pretend that Regional Area Differential GNSS comprises from M 
Reference Station (Fig. 5) 
 RS j Mj , , .� �=1   (11) 
 
Fig. 5. Regional Area Differential GNSS: this figure shows a receivers at a known 
position (the Reference Stations) and a receivers on board of the vehicles  
at an unknown position (i. e. the rover or user) for relative positioning.  
The Radio Beacons transmit the local corrections across a radio or wired  
communication channel to Master Station and Master Station after approximation 
of local data transmit the regional correction across Radio Beacons  
or may be through a communication satellite (a selection of communication  
channel depends on the size and configuration of the region) to all vehicles witch 
are in this region 
Since RS j  are at known locations x y zj
rs
j
rs
j
rs, ,�{ }  we can compute the 
real distance from RS j  to satellites Sati  as 
 D x x y y z z
i N N j
i j
rs
i j
rs
i j
rs
i j
rs
, ,
, , , ,
= -( ) + -( ) + -( )
= і =
2 2 2
1 4 1
�
� � �M .�
  (12) 
We calculate the assessment of the distance from RS j  to satellites Sati  
(pseudo-ranges) by determining the signal propagation time from RS to the 
satellites Sati  as 
 D cT i N N j Mi j
rs
i j
rs
 
, , , , , , ,= = і =� � � � �1 4 1   (13) 
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and now we can compute the correction of a pseudo-ranges for all vehicles in 
the j-one limited scopes:
 D = - = і =D D D i N N j Mi j
rs
i j
rs
i j
rs
, , ,( ), , , , ,
 � � � � �1 4 1 .  (14) 
The Radio Beacons transmit the local correction DDi j
rs
,  to Master Sta-
tion, which solves the problem of interpolation a plurality of samples DDi j
rs
, �
into distribution functions of positioning. For each navigation satellite we 
know the value of the function (14) at the interpolation nodes, and we can 
determine the value of DD x yi

,( )  at any point x y,( )  of a region, in which 
there are RS. The solution to this problem is to construct a polynomial in-
terpolation of the receiving nodes in the prescribed values and the calcu-
lation of the value of this polynomial in a point of interest to us x y,( )  
(Table 1).
After approximation of local data Master Station transmit the region-
al correction DD x y zi

, ,( )  across radio beacons or may be through a com-
munication satellite (a selection of communication channel depends on the 
size and configuration of the region) to all vehicles witch are in this region. 
Each vehicle adjusting their pseudo-ranges as 
 



D D D x y z cT D x y z ii
v
i
v
i v v v i
v
i v v v
�
�
� � � � � �= - D = - D =( , , ) ( , , ), ,1 N N, .і 4  (15) 
In this case the system of the equations (14) assumes the form 
x x y y z z D cT D x y zi v i v i v i
v
i
v
i v v v-( ) + -( ) + -( ) = = - D    

2 2 2 � � �( , , ),
, , .� �i N N= і1 4
 (16) 
The navigation processor of vehicle solves the system of equations (16) 
and calculate the position of the vehicle ( , , )  x y zv v v� � .
It is assumed that DD x y zi

, ,( )  tabulated (sampling and quantization), 
i. e. interpolation results are presented in the form of a four-dimensional 
array 
 D = D + ЧD + ЧD + ЧD( ) =i k l n iD x k x y l y z n z i N, , , , , , , , ,

min min min� � � �1   (17)
where k
x x
x
l
y y
y
n
z z
z
=
-
D
- =
-
D
- =
-
D
-0 1 0 1 0 1, , , , , ,max min max min max min� �  
D D D( )x y z, ,  — steps sampling of function DD x y zi

, ,( ) . 
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For example, there are base stations in the territory of the Polish Repub-
lic in the ASG-EUPOS system (Fig. 6).
Fig. 6. Distribution of ASG-EUPOS reference stations 
(with kind permission from Bujakowski-Surveyor General of Poland)  6 
In Fig. 7 you can see the coverage area of the territory of the Polish Re-
public by the correction field.
 2.4. Maritime Wide Area DGNSS Positioning
A network of reference stations is the base unit which provides high pre-
cision coordinate-time information about the location of vessels in coastal 
waters  7. This network is organized in areas where the density of traffic and 
the existing navigation and hydrographic support of navigation safety are de-
manding higher levels of courts in order to protect the environment and re-
6 Head Office of Geodesy and Cartography. Poland, 2013 [Electronic Resource]. 
URL: http://www.asgeupos.pl/webpg/graph/dwnld/map_en_dwnld.jpg [URL Address is 
avaliable 5/14/2017 6:48 PM].
7 This section deals with the problems of maritime transport, but the results of this 
section can be extended to all types of vehicles. 
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duce downtime of vessels and to achieve smooth operation of the fleet, pro-
viding quality rescue at sea.
Fig. 7. ASG-EUPOS system description. NetRTK GPS+GLO  
coverage area  8 
The Radio Beacons transmit the local correction DDi j
rs
,  to Master Sta-
tion, which solves the problem of interpolation a plurality of samples DDi j
rs
, �
into distribution functions of positioning. For each navigation satellite we 
know the value of the function (15) at the interpolation nodes, and we can 
determine the value of DD x yi

,( )  at any point x y,( )  of a region, in which 
there are RS. The solution to this problem is to construct a polynomial in-
terpolation of the receiving nodes in the prescribed values and the calcu-
lation of the value of this polynomial in a point of interest to us x y,( )  
(Table 2).
8 ASG-EUPOS  [Electronic Resource]. URL: http://www.asgeupos.
pl/webpg/graph/img/_syst_descr/stations_gg_EN.png [URL Address is avaliable 
5/14/2017 6:48 PM].
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Fig. 8. Wide Area Differential GNSS: this figure shows a receivers at a known  
position (the Reference Stations) and a receivers on board of the vehicles at  
an unknown position (i. e. the rover or user) for relative positioning. The Radio  
Beacons transmit the local corrections across a radio or wired communication 
channel to Master Station and Master Station after approximation of local data 
transmit the wide correction across a communication satellite or group  
of satellites to all vehicles 
And the expression (17) takes the form 
 D = + ЧD + ЧD( ) = іi k l iD x k x y l y i N N, , , , , , ,D

min min� � � �1 3   (18) 
where k
x x
x
l
y y
y
=
-
D
- =
-
D
-0 1 0 1, , ,max min max min� , D Dx y, �  — steps sam-
pling of function DD x yi

,( ) .
In practice, the task of 2D interpolation on a non-uniform grid can be 
solved using standard software procedures, such as MATLAB — a two-di-
mensional interpolation on the irregular grid:
Syntax: ZI = griddata (x, y, z, XI, YI) Description: Function ZI = grid-
data (x, y, z, XI, YI) returns an array of ZI, which is defined on the new grid 
{XI, YI} as a result of interpolation of the initial function z, defined on a non-
uniform grid {x, y} i. e. z f x y= ( ), .
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Two examples of the task solutions of 2D interpolation on a non-
uniform grid for 13 RS  9 (a) and for 8 RS  10 (b), located in {14 ≤ E ≤ 15; 
54 ≤ N ≤ 55} (Fig. 9). As Z used the sum of two fields (random and deterministic) 
 Z E N
REND
e
E N
E N
E,
()
,
, ,
( ) = -ж
и
з
ц
ш
ч +
-( )
-
-( )
10
1 2
1
2
14 5
2
54 5
2
2
2
2
ps s
s sN
2
 (19)
where 0 1Ј ЈREND()  is a random number, s sE N= = 0 5, .
 
Fig. 9. A two non-uniform grids: a) 13 RS on the ground (~60×110 km);  
b) 8 RS by the sea (~50×100 km) 
Fig. 10. 2D interpolation on a non-uniform grid for 13 RS as fig. 9, a) 
9 E = [14.00 14.05 14.05 14.25 14.50 14.50 14.50 14.50 14.50 14.75 14.95 14.95 15.00]; 
N = [54.50 54.05 54.95 54.50 54.00 54.25 54.50 54.80 55.00 54.50 54.05 54.95 54.50]; 
Z = [0.40 0.17 0.17 0.75 0.39 0.73 0.85 0.65 0.37 0.70 0.15 0.22 0.39]; 
e = 14:0.1:15; n=54:0.1:55; XI, YI] = meshgrid (e, n); 
ZI = griddata (E, N, Z, XI, YI); mesh (XI, YI, ZI), hold on, plot3 (E, N, Z, ‘ok’)
10 E = [14.00 14.05 14.05 14.50 14.50 14.95 14.95 15.00]; 
N = [54.50 54.05 54.95 54.00 55.00 54.05 54.95 54.50]; 
Z = [0.40 0.17 0.17 0.39 0.37 0.15 0.22 0.39]; 
e = 14:0.1:15; n=54:0.1:55; XI, YI] = meshgrid (e, n); 
ZI = griddata (E, N, Z, XI, YI); mesh (XI, YI, ZI), hold on, plot3 (E, N, Z, ‘ok’)
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The application griddata is admissible only for 2D vehicle (ship, vessel, 
boat, car, etc.), i. e. for the case where z j
rs = const . For each navigation sat-
ellite i N N= і1 3, ,  we replace 3D non-uniform grid D ( )D x y zi jrs jrs jrs jrs, , ,  
(Table 2) on 2D non-uniform grid D ( )D x yi jrs jrs jrs, , , j M=1, . Determine 
uniform grid {XI, YI} in the region { , }x x x y y zmin max min maxЈ Ј Ј Ј�  with 
sampling steps D D{ }x y, �  and we use procedure griddata as and we use pro-
cedure griddata (Fig. 11).
Fig. 11. 2D interpolation on a non-uniform grid for 8 RS as fig. 9, b) 
For i N=1, �   % N і3  because it considered only 2D vehicle (ship, vessel, 
boat, car, etc.)
ZI= griddata ( x y D XI YIrs rs i
rs
* * ,*, , , , )� � �1 D   % Symbol (*) means all elements 
of the array
D =i ZI,*,*
End 
2.5. Moving DGNSS Positioning
One drawback of Differential GNSS is that the installation of Differen-
tial Station requires a significant investment in the geodetic reference. In the 
case of rapid deployment of Differential GNSS can be used Moving Differ-
ential GNSS (Fig. 12).
Basic data GNSS (N height and width of the space E) are clustered around 
a central point (Fig. 13).
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Fig. 12. Detection of GNSS spoofi ng in MDGNSS mode: shore-based Moving 
Diff erential Station (MDS) 
 
 
53,42947
53,42957
53,42967
53,42977
53,42987
53,42997
14,56338 14,56358 14,56378 14,56398 14,56418
The exact coordinates  
N = 53,429732  
E = 14,563658 
Fig. 13. Example of focusing N and E around a central point 
Assume that moving BS is set at a point with unknown coordinates 
(E, N). Moving BS receives signals from navigation satellites and determine its 
current position with a periodicity Δt.
 E N ii i, , , .( ) = Ґ1   (20) 
Thus, in order to determine their coordinates (E, N) with suffi  cient ac-
curacy to calculate the value of the arithmetic average  E NI I, � �( ) of (Ei, Ni) 
at time IΔt
  E
I
E N
I
NI
i
I
i I
i
I
i= =
= =
е е1 1
1 1
, .�   (21) 
So, for example, we have 200 samples of Ni  (Fig. 14) and the estimates 
for the coordinates N for I =1 200,  (Fig. 15).
 N
I
NI
i
I
i=
=
е1
1
  (22) 
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53,4295
53,4296
53,4297
53,4298
53,4299
53,43
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 10
1
11
1
12
1
13
1
14
1
15
1
16
1
17
1
18
1
19
1
Fig. 14. An example of the measurements N ii, ,� =1 200 , D =t s1  
 
53,42972
53,42973
53,42974
53,42975
53,42976
53,42977
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 10
1
11
1
12
1
13
1
14
1
15
1
16
1
17
1
18
1
19
1
Fig. 15. An example of the computing N II , ,� =1 200 , D =t s1  
In this example for measurements E we have 200 samples of Ei  (Fig. 16) 
and the estimates for the coordinates E for I =1 200,  (Fig. 17).
 E
I
EI
i
I
i=
=
е1
1
.   (23).
 
 
14,5634
14,5635
14,5636
14,5637
14,5638
14,5639
1 13 25 37 49 61 73 85 97 10
9
12
1
13
3
14
5
15
7
16
9
18
1
19
3
Fig. 16. An example of the measurements E ii, ,� =1 200 , D =t s1  
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14,56363
14,56364
14,56365
14,56366
14,56367
14,56368
14,56369
1 10 19 28 37 46 55 64 73 82 91 10
0
10
9
11
8
12
7
13
6
14
5
15
4
16
3
17
2
18
1
19
0
19
9
Fig. 17. An example of the computing E II , ,� =1 200 , D =t s1  
The arithmetic means of geographic coordinates of moving BS ( NI  and 
EI ) are clustered around a central point (Fig. 18). 
 
53,42947
53,42957
53,42967
53,42977
53,42987
53,42997
14,56338 14,56358 14,56378 14,56398
The exact coordinates  
N = 53,429732, E = 14,563658 
Fig. 18. Example of focusing NI  and EI  around a central point 
Comparing fi gures 13 and 18 we can conclude that with the technology 
of the moving BS we can be arranged Moving DGNSS with an acceptable 
accuracy for many applications. Selecting I depends on the requirements of 
positioning accuracy BS, which increases with increasing I.
3. GNSS and DGNSS Spoofing
 3.1. GNSS Spoofi ng
The spoofer can be built on the basis of laboratory GNSS signal gener-
ator designed for debugging GNSS receivers. Spoofi ng is possible to build 
a system based on a particular set of SDR (Software-defi ned radio — soft-
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ware-defined radio), for they have the appropriate software. Approximate 
cost is 1–10 thousand euro. A victim moves in space with the civil GNSS 
procedure and is subjected to an spoofing attack from other vehicles on the 
ground or at sea, which will called “spoofer”. GNSS spoofing is the GNSS 
signal conversion technology. Spoofer plans to organize an attack, so that 
the navigator should not know that the signal received by GNSS receiver is 
false. As a result of an organized attack, the navigator determines wrong time 
and/or location. This means that the spoofer began to administer the GNSS 
position in time and space.
The distortion of the signal includes a signal capture and playback at the 
same frequency with a slight shift in time and with greater intensity, in order 
to deceive the electronic equipment of a victim and, respectively, co-driver, 
of course, if there is one on board the vehicle.
 
Fig. 19. GNSS Spoofing: a vehicles, such as unmanned aircraft or helicopter, 
the vessel etc., called a victim 
The only GNSS system switch can’t be deceive, are GNSS military sys-
tems, that utilizes principles of cryptography. However, for GNSS civil use 
such protection doesn’t exist. Therefore, the research of spoofing property for 
anti-spoofers design must be conducted. The spoofing main idea is illustrat-
ed in Fig. 9. Spoofer is generally located in the immediate vicinity of the vic-
tim and moves in space with civilian or military GNSS mode (L1 or L1/L2).
Spoofer performs short-term disruption of the GNSS signal L1 using 
GNSS jammer. As a result of jamming GNSS receiver „loses satellites” 
and starts looking for GNSS signals. At this time, spoofer includes imitator 
GNSS signals, which is set up to imitate the new coordinates of the GNSS 
receiver. Generally, GNSS signal strength exceeds the strength of imitator 
real GNSS signals and GNSS receiver can’t determine from what time of its 
movement in space it is controlled by a spoofer.
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 3.2. DGNSS Spoofing
The Radio Beacon of spoofer transmit the false correction DDi
f  to 
the victim, that “adjusting” their pseudo-range as 
   D D D cT D i N Ni
v
i
v
i
f
i
v
i
f , , ,= -D( ) = - D( ) = і1 4.  (24) 
In this case the system of the equations (2) assumes the form 
x x y y z z cT D x yi f i f i f i
v
i
f
f-( ) + -( ) + -( ) = - D( )мно ьэю®    
2 2 2
� �( , f fz
i N N
, ),
, , .
�
�

= і1 4
 (25) 
The navigation processor of vehicle solves the system of equations (22) 
and calculate the false position of the victim ( , , )  x y zf f f� � .
 
Fig. 20. DGNSS Spoofing 
4. GNSS and DGNSS Spoofing Detection
 4.1. Spoofing Detection of Local Area DGNSS Positioning
The navigation processor of victim solves the system of the equations 
(26) [8–12] 
 x x y y z z cT i N Ni v i v i v i
v
-( ) + -( ) + -( ) = = і2 2 2 1 4 , , ,� �   (26) 
and calculates the coordinates of the victim ( , , )x y zv v v� � � using the GNSS 
signals without any corrections. It then computes the distance between the 
two victim positions 
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 D = -( ) + -( ) + -( )D x x y y z zv f v f v f   
2 2 2
.  (27) 
If the vehicle is not exposed to the type of spoofing attack, the difference 
between the calculated coordinates cannot exceed a certain maximum posi-
tioning error DDmax  on normal mode GNSS (DGNSS mode is not avail-
able), i. e.
 D ЈD D D max   (28) 
and the decision rule of algorithm for spoofing’s determining can be written as 
 if ( )D ЈD D D max  then OK else goto SPOOFING.  (29) 
 4.2. Spoofing Detection of Maritime Wide Area DGNSS
The Radio Beacons transmit the local corrections across a radio or wired 
communication channel to Master Station and Master Station after approx-
imation of local data transmit the wide correction across a telecommunica-
tion satellite to all vehicles that adjusting their pseudo-range  11.
 
Fig. 21. Spoofing Detection of Maritime Wide Area Differential GNSS 
The Radio Beacon of spoofer transmit the false correction DDi
f  to 
the victim, that “adjusting” their pseudo-range as 
   D D D cT D i N Ni
v
i
v
i
f
i
v
i
f�
�
� � �= -D( ) = - D( ) = і, , ,1 3.  (30) 
In this case we can make the system of the equations 
 x x y y z cT D i N Ni f i f i i
v
i
f-( ) + -( ) + = - D( ) = і  2 2 2 1 3, , ,� � .  (31) 
11 The section “Spoofing Detection using Regional Area Differential GNSS” omit-
ted because implemented similarly. We consider 2D Spoofing Detection for maritime 
applications.
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The navigation processor of victim solves the system of equations (31) and 
calculate the false position of the victim ( , ) x yf f� , solves the system of equa-
tions (32) and calculate the coordinates of the victim ( , )x y Nv v� � � �for і3 us-
ing the GNSS signals without any corrections.
 x x y y z cT x yi v i v i i
v
v v-( ) + -( ) + ={ }®� � � � �2 2 2  ( , ).  (32) 
It then computes the distance between the two vehicle positions 
 D = -( ) + -( )D x x y yv f v f  
2 2
.  (33) 
If the vehicle is not exposed to the type of spoofing attack, the difference 
between the calculated coordinates cannot exceed a certain maximum po-
sitioning error DDmax  on normal mode GNSS (DGNSS mode is not avail-
able), i. e.
 D Ј DD D max   (34) 
and the decision rule of algorithm for spoofing’s determining can be written as 
 if ( )D Ј DD D max  then OK else goto SPOOFING.  (35) 
 4.3. Spoofing Detection of Shore-based Moving DGNSS
Since BS is at location ( , ) N EI I�  we can compute the real distance from 
BS to satellites Sati  as 
 D x E y N z i N Ni
rs
i I i I i= -( ) + -( ) + = і� � � 
2 2
2 1 3, , , .  (36) 
We calculate r i
bs
, Dri
bs , ri
v � , ( , ) x yv v�  and � �( , )x yv v  by analogy with sec-
tions “Differential GNSS Positioning” and “Spoofing Detection using Dif-
ferential GNSS” and then we can compute the distance between the two ve-
hicle positions ( , ) x yv v�  and � �( , )x yv v  as 
 D = -( ) + -( )D x x y yv v v v  
2 2 .  (37) 
If the vehicle is not exposed to the type of spoofing attack, the difference 
between the calculated coordinates cannot exceed a certain maximum po-
sitioning error DDmax  on normal mode GNSS (DGNSS mode is not avail-
able), i. e.
 D Ј DD D max   (38) 
and the decision rule of algorithm for spoofing’s determining can be written as 
 if ( )maxD Ј DD D  then OK else goto SPOOFING.  (39) 
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 4.4. Spoofing Detection of Offshore Moving DGNSS
If you want to use Differential GNSS offshore (> 200 km), the 
MDS = RS + RB can be placed on a floating platform with the anchor, 
such as shown in Fig. 22. Under the influence of the wind and water cur-
rents MDS constantly drifting, so can be used to estimate the coordinates of 
MDS E N, �( )  with sufficient accuracy to calculate the value of the arithmetic 
average  E NI I, � �( ) of E Ni i, �( )  at time I tD  
  E
I
E N
I
N I T t j Ij
i
I
i j j
i
I
i j w= = = D = Ґ
=
+
=
+е е1 1
1 1
, , [ / ], , ,� � � �   (40)
Tw -window of the average.
This means that with a frequency 1/ Dt  there is a sliding updated esti-
mates � �E N,( )  in a time window Tw .
 
Fig. 22. Detection of GNSS spoofing in Offshore Moving DGNSS mode 
Selecting Tw  depends on the requirements of positioning accuracy BS, 
which increases with increasing Tw . It is important that during Tw  MDS 
coordinates would not change more than a predetermined positioning ac-
curacy. Detailed analysis and resolution of this conflict is beyond the scope 
of this article.
Since BS is at location ( , ) N Ej j  we can compute the real distance from 
BS to satellites Sati  as 
 ri j
rs
i j i j ix E y N z i N N j I, , , , , ,= -( ) + -( ) + = і = Ґ� � � � � 
2 2
2 1 3 .  (41) 
We calculate r i j
bs
, , Dri j
bs
, , ri j
v
,
� , ( , ), , x yv j v j� �  and ( , ), ,x yv j v j�  by analogy 
with sections “Differential GNSS Positioning” and “Spoofing Detection us-
ing Differential GNSS” and then we can compute the distance between the 
two vehicle positions ( , ), , x yv j v j� �  and ( , ), ,x yv j v j�  as 
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 D = -( ) + -( ) = ҐD x x y y j Ij v j v j v j v j  , , , , , ,
2 2
� � .  (42) 
If the vehicle is not exposed to the type of spoofing attack, the difference 
between the calculated coordinates cannot exceed a certain maximum po-
sitioning error DDmax  on normal mode GNSS (DGNSS mode is not avail-
able), i. e.
 D Ј DD Dj max , j I= Ґ, �   (43) 
and the decision rule of algorithm for spoofing’s determining can be written as 
 if D Ј DD Dj max  then OK else goto SPOOFING, j I= Ґ, � .  (44) 
5. Summary and conclusions
The risk of losing GNSS signal is growing every day. The accessories for 
the manufacture of systems GNSS “Jamming and/or Spoofing” are now 
widely available and it can take advantage of not only military, but also ter-
rorists. The distortion of the signal includes a signal capture and playback at 
the same frequency with a slight shift in time and with greater intensity, in 
order to deceive the electronic equipment of a victim and, respectively, co-
driver, of course, if there is one on board the vehicle. The price of one chip-
set of such equipment is in the range of 1–10 thousand euros, depending 
on the dimensions and weight parameters. The principles of spoofing de-
tection of local, regional and wide DGNSS, in which a correction signals of 
differential station uses for spoofing and for detection of spoofing are con-
stantly evolving. But this methods has one obvious drawback — is supposed 
to use a fixed (stationary) differential GNSS station. Our many years of re-
search in the field of spoofing detection [8–12] give us confidence that this de-
ficiency is avoidable thanks implement mobile differential station, including 
floating.
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